I document the salient features of monetary and fiscal outcomes for the Venezuelan economy during the 1960 to 2016 period. Using the consolidated government budget accounting framework of Chapter 2, I assess the importance of fiscal balance, seigniorage, and growth in accounting for the evolution of debt ratios. I find that extraordinary transfers, mostly associated with unprofitable public enterprises, and not central government primary deficits, account for the increase in financing needs in recent decades. Seigniorage has been a consistent source of financing of deficits and transfers-especially in the last decade-with increases in debt ratios being important in some periods. †
Introduction
In the post-war era, Venezuela represents one of the most dramatic growth experiences in the world. Measured as real gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in international dollars, Venezuela attained levels of more than 80% of that of the US by the end of 1960. It has also experienced one of the most dramatic declines, with levels of relative real GDP per capita reaching less than 30% of that of the US nowadays. Understanding the featuresinstitutional or policy driven-that determined such dramatic episodes of growth and collapse is of great importance. The purpose of this paper is to take a small step toward understanding some aspects of the institutions and policies that may have contributed to these experiences. The focus is on the monetary and fiscal outcomes during the period between 1960 and 2016. While the connection of monetary and fiscal policies to long-run growth may seem tenuous, in the case of Venezuela, these policies provide a perspective on the extent to which the government was involved-directly or indirectly-in the determination of prices, the allocation of resources, and therefore, outcomes.
Venezuela became on oil economy after discovering crude oil around 1913, with a large endowment of oil reserves. Today, Venezuela enjoys one of the largest proven oil reserves in the world. During the 1920s, oil production, at the time mostly done through concessions to foreign companies, was an important contributor to Venezuela's structural transformation and development. Over time, discussions about the nationalization of the oil industry in the late 1960s and early 1970s put a break in this development, even though nationalization was formalized only in 1976. For instance, total crude oil production declined substantially from the peak in 1970 by 70% in the mid-1980s. In addition, the nationalization of the industry and its impact on fiscal policy implied that distortions accumulated over time as vast amounts of resources were being allocated by government officials and disparate policies and not by market forces. These distortions were exacerbated with the increase in oil prices in 1974-which lead to a windfall in government revenues-and the larger volatility observed in oil prices since then. Oil represents more than 90% of all exports and more than 60% of government revenues. But contrary to some theories, such as that of Dutch disease, oil is not the problem of the Venezuelan economy, the problem lies in how the vast amounts of resources generated from oil were utilized. Other economies, such as Norway, have managed oil wealth properly, with diametrically different economic outcomes. Venezuela is also distinct from many other Latin American economies in that for as much of the economic decline, Venezuela enjoyed a period of relative macroeconomic stability. Figure   2 documents the yearly inflation rate from 1960 to 2016. From 1960 to 1986, inflation was almost always below 30% but since 1987 inflation has been almost always above 30%, with 80% in 1989, more than 100% in 1996, and more than 500% in 2016.
Only in recent years, has Venezuela suffered a more standard period of hyperinflation among Latin American economies, fueled by a substantial and systematic process of government deficits that in the absence of external credit are being financed by seigniorage and the inflation tax. To make a systematic analysis of monetary and fiscal outcomes, I follow the conceptual framework of Chapter 2 (the consolidated government-budget equation) to account for the events that lead to episodes of substantial inflation or run-up in debt. Interestingly and contrary to many other Latin American economies, the contribution to financing needs of the government does not rest with primary deficits or even commitments on government debt. Instead, a large amount of transfers to other decentralized agencies account for all the financing needs, which paradoxically usually occur during periods of oil revenue booms.
During the entire time period between 1960 and 2016, seigniorage is the source of funds that accounts for most of the financing needs, while increases in internal and external public debt account for an important portion during some periods.
This paper is broadly related to the literature analyzing the growth experience of Venezuela such as Hausmann (2003) , Bello et al. (2011) , and Agnani and Iza (2011) , although the present analysis focuses on the fiscal and monetary outcomes rather than growth specifically.
1 Da Costa and Olivo (2008) study monetary policy in the context of oil economies with an application to Venezuela. The paper is also broadly related to the literature on the resource 1 For a thorough discussion of the economic environment during the period of study see Hausmann and Rodríguez (2014) and the references therein. curse, e.g., Manzano and Rigobon (2001) and Hausmann and Rigobon (2003) .
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I present a background of the macroeconomic history of the Venezuelan economy. Section 3 performs the analysis from the accounting framework. I conclude in Section 4. result, the time path of relative income reflects closely the actual growth process of Venezuela relative to the US. However, the implied level of relative income depends heavily on which set of international prices is used to aggregate output and, as a consequence, relative income levels can vary substantially with different benchmark prices. For this reason, the new version of the Maddison data includes series of real GDP per capita that take into account multiple rounds of international prices. And while it is meant to more accurately reflect differences in income at a point in time, it does not reflect the process of growth well in each country. Figure 4 reports GDP per capita in Venezuela relative to the US for both the 2011 benchmark prices (solid line) as well as the multiple benchmark (dashed line). As discussed in Figure 1 in the introduction, the growth of real GDP per capita shows periods of positive performance as well as periods of strong volatility and decline. In describing the specific monetary and fiscal outcomes below, it is useful to keep in mind the following three broad periods in the Venezuelan economy. First, from 1960 to 1977, real GDP per capita increased by 2.3% annually, and it was a period of relative macroeconomic stability with negligible or low fiscal deficits, and low inflation, and although debt rose toward the end of the period, it was still relatively low. As I discuss below, this relative macroeconomic stability hides strong changes occurring with oil production around the nationalization of the industry and with revenues from oil that may have set the stage for worsening outcomes in To put these fluctuations in GDP in perspective recall that the typical business cycle in the US amounts to a standard deviation of filtered log real GDP of slightly more than 1% for yearly series. Hence, economic fluctuations are orders of magnitude larger in Venezuela than in the US, especially for the period starting in 1974.
Economic Background
Three major changes provide context for the economic performance of Venezuela. First, the discovery of oil reserves in the early 1910s promoted a strong process of structural transformation whereby economic activity reallocated from agricultural and rural areas to the oil industry and urban areas. For instance, the share of agriculture in GDP declined from more than 30% in 1920 to less than 5% nowadays; whereas, the share of oil production in There is a tight association between oil prices and real economic activity, documented in Figure 7 . But the transmission of oil price shocks to economic activity is not through fluctuations in the oil industry as discussed earlier, instead it is through fiscal policy broadly defined. By law, the oil industry must supply all revenues in foreign currency to the Central Bank in exchange for domestic currency, and taxes are imposed on the industry that leave minimal margins for investment in the sector. Notes: Real GDP per capital is in constant 1997 prices. The oil price is deflated by the CPI in the US.
the 1960s government revenues were about 16% of GDP, but in 1974 as a result of the first big oil-price shock, revenues increased to more than 30% of GDP and have oscillated around 25% since then, with positive and negative variations of more than 10 percentage points in a given year. On average, oil represents around 60% of total government revenues. Contrary to many other economies in which government expenditures appear countercyclical, in Venezuela government expenditures are procyclical.
from the IMF and other institutions. The primary deficit is estimated from the total deficit minus interest payments of public debt, which is available for the entire period. Venezuela is classified in two forms, internal and external, essentially differing on whether the debt is denominated in local currency or in US dollars. Traditionally, internal debt was contracted with domestic residents and external debt with foreign residents, but this distinction has blurred over time as domestic residents have used external bonds as an instrument to bypass foreign exchange controls. I follow the fiscal budget convention of valuing the stock of external debt at the end of each year at the official exchange rate. But in this context, it is important to note that in some periods the wedge between the official and market exchange rates can be very large and, as a result, the ratio of debt to income can understate the real burden of the debt. Figure 10 documents that between 1960 and mid-1970s, public debt was less than 10% of income and a large fraction of the total debt was internal debt. This characterization changed dramatically after the first oil-price shock, and the debt-to-income ratio increased to almost 100% in the mid-1980s. Most of the increase is accounted for by external debt. To illustrate the importance of the exchange rate in the valuation of external debt, note that in the mid-1980s if the market exchange rate is used instead of the official rate, the debt-to-GDP ratio reaches more than 150% in 1986. Similarly, at the end of 2016, the wedge between the black-market exchange rate and the official rate is a factor of 320-fold, which implies that the debt-to-income ratio exceeds 600% using the market rate instead of the 6.3% under the official rate. Movements in the real exchange rate also play an important role in accounting for the variation in the debt ratio. Figure 11 shows the role of the movement in the real exchange rate in debt ratios by reporting the debt ratio using a constant 1960 real exchange rate. An important portion of the run-up in the 1980s is associated with changes in the real exchange rate.
Just as with real GDP per capita, there is a close association between the increase in the external public debt and oil prices. Figure 12 documents the amount of external public debt in real 1960 US prices and real crude oil prices, with the substantial increases in oil prices in the mid-1970s and 1980s slightly preceding the sharp increase in real debt.
There is also a close association between the increase in public debt and international reserves. To put this link in context, Figure 13 documents the debt-to-GDP ratio net of international reserves. While the level of debt ratios is lower when considering international reserves, the increase in debt ratios between the mid-1970s and mid-1980s is almost as substantial when neglecting the increase in reserves during the period. Notes: External debt is valued at the official exchange rate at the end of the period. Net of international reserves is internal debt plus external debt minus international reserves valued at official exchange rate.
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In the 1960s and early 1970s external debt represented around 50% of international reserves, increasing to more than 100 % in the 1980s. The ratio of external debt to international reserves reached more than 2-fold at the end of 1986 and more than 3.5-fold by the end of 1988. This substantial run-up in debt by the government affected government finances due to the heavy load that the payments of principal, and to a lesser extent interest, represented of the overall income. In particular, Figure 14 shows the amount of public debt service as a proportion of government revenue. Debt service includes all payments related to public debt, Exchange Rate. Venezuela has experienced several exchange rate systems, from long periods of fixed exchange rates-in some cases with multiple rates-to some periods of floating exchange rates. It has also experienced long periods with capital controls. A key feature of the exchange rate market in Venezuela in the last four decades is the fact that most of the supply of foreign currency has been in the hands of the Central Bank since the state oil company is required by law to sell all receipts in foreign currency to the Central Bank in exchange for local currency. This implies that even in periods of exchange rate flexibility, there is substantial discretion in the hands of public officials to determine exchange rates. Notes: Debt service includes all payments related to internal and external public debt inclusive of principal, interest, and commissions. External debt service payments are valued at official exchange rates following the reporting of the interest payments in the government fiscal statistics. Total debt service is expressed relative to government revenues, and external debt service is expressed relative to international reserves.
documents the lowest official nominal exchange rate at the end of the period between 1960 and 2016. This is the rate that prevails in fiscal accounts and in particular for the valuation of external debt and associated payments as well as for the conversion of foreign exchange revenues from oil exports. In some periods, this rate also prevails for imports of goods considered essential, and the administration of this preferential rate has been an important source of corruption in the last four decades.
The two decades before 1960 represented a period of relative stability in foreign exchange for Venezuela with a unique and fixed exchange rate, as during this period capital flows were positive from many European immigrants and the cumulative increase in oil production.
There were also positive capital flows from new oil concessions granted by the government due background for the events that unfolded. There was a loss of confidence in the banking system, and a lack of a coherent plan from the new government generated a remarkable drop in the demand for money and capital flight pressures, which eventually lead to more than 17 failed financial institutions (representing 60% of assets of financial institutions and 50% of deposits). Conservative estimates put the total cost of bailouts at 10% of GDP, but more careful estimates put this figure at 20% of GDP, see for instance Garc´ıa et al. (1998) .
In the last few years, multiple rates have been established, as well as different administrative units, all involved in corruption scandals in the allocation of foreign currency at preferential rates. The misalignment of the official exchange rate and the "black market" rate has been so large-reaching factor differences of more than 100 times between the market rate and the official rate-that the assignment of preferential dollars has been a contentious issue in Venezuela for more than a decade. Figure 16 reports the yearly inflation rate and the yearly growth in the monetary base for the Venezuelan economy. It is important to note that during the sample period in many respects the Venezuelan economy was (and continues to be) a heavily regulated economy, including the implementation of price controls, especially for basic food and other essential products, interest rates, exchange rates, among many other prices. Specifically related to inflation, there have been many episodes when price controls 
Money and Inflation.

Analysis
The budget equation
Since there are two main classifications of debt for Venezuela, internal and external, I modify the consolidated budget equation in Chapter 2 to incorporate those two classes of debt.
Indexed debt has not been used in Venezuela. The lack of data on the maturity structure of debt prevents a disaggregated analysis. However, while in some periods short-term debt was used, the majority of debt issuance was long term (more than a year). In addition, available data from the World Bank's World Debt Tables indicates that the average maturity of Venezuelan external debt was fairly constant at around ten years.
As discussed in Chapter 2, the consolidated budget constraint can be written in terms of real GDP and in differences as follows:
where θ is real internal debt to real GDP, θ * is real external debt to real GDP, ξ is the real exchange rate calculated as (E · P W )/P , m is the ratio of monetary base to GDP, d and t are the primary deficit and transfers to GDP, π and π W are the gross domestic and imported inflation, and g is the gross real GDP growth. The first four terms in the left-hand side of equation (1) represent the sources of financing for the consolidated government: internal debt, external debt, seigniorage, and the inflation tax; whereas, the four terms in the lefthand side represent the obligations: the primary deficit, transfers, internal debt payments, and external debt payments.
Note that transfers t is an important component of the consolidated budget and represents more than just extraordinary transfers. Part of these transfers includes discounted debt issuance or repurchases that should be included in R and r. It also includes a wide array of transfers between the central government and the non-financial public sector. Lack of disag- 1975-1986 1987-2005 2006-2016 1961-2016 (1 gregated data prevents me from allocating these individual components into the appropriate terms in the budget equation. The approach that I follow is to calculate these transfers as a residual, essentially the residual that validates the budget equation every period.
Accounting results
In each year, I compute the terms in equation (1). Table 1 Obligations. I now analyze the elements accounting for the changes in financing needs.
Overwhelmingly, real transfers t t are the most important obligation accounting for all of the financing needs of the government. On average, they represent more than 3 p.p., while the primary deficit was negligible on average. for social programs; in addition, government intervention in the company's activities has meant shrinking production capacity and cash flows. As a consequence of these characteristics, and despite one of the largest oil-price booms in recent history, the government has found it harder to obtain new loans with mounting fiscal deficits, resorting to much more substantial seigniorage. This is a period also in which real GDP per capita and labor productivity are contracting, for example, real GDP per capita is essentially the same in 2013 as in 2007, and declined between 2013 to 2016 by 30%.
As discussed earlier (see Table 1 and growth in accounting for the evolution of debt ratios. I found that extraordinary transfers, mostly associated with unprofitable public enterprises, and not central government deficits, account for the increase in financing needs in the recent decades. The inflation tax has been a consistent source of financing needs, especially in the last ten years, with increases in debt ratios being particularly important in some periods. Interestingly, debt exposure has increased in periods of oil-price booms.
